“I gather that the UK presented a whole draft protocol to the Council legal service the day before the meeting, detailing various subjects in the field of financial affairs where they wished decision-taking to switch from QMV to unanimity (some in areas that have been QMV from the beginning, and some that have been QMV since the 1986 Single European Act negotiated by Thatcher). Whatever the merits, presenting such a detailed document at the last minute in that way was not likely to work: one would have expected any such request to have been sent to every government and talked through extensively with them beforehand, if it were to have the remotest chance of being accepted.

A turning point in the meeting was when there seemed to be near consensus on Van Rompuy’s proposal to use Protocol 12, which can be changed by a (unanimous ) decision of the European Council without requiring a lengthy IGC and subsequent national ratification. Germany was the one that was isolated at that point, arguing for a fully fledged treaty. Then, the President asked whether Britain would want any “compensations” in this case too, or at least whether it might not need so many  (given that Cameron had said in the House of Commons “the more eurozone countries ask for, the more we will ask for in return”: logically a lesser demand should require less compensation). However, Cameron said that his demands would be the same. Given that there was no sympathy at all for his demands, this was the point at which the Protocol 12 route, which requires unanimity, was effectively closed down and one country after another accepted a new treaty at 17+.”

Without Cameron’s spectacular kamikaze act, the continuing disagreements between Merkel and Sarkozy would have dominated today’s news. Instead, he’s achieved the remarkable feat of uniting the eurozone, but at great cost to his own country and to himself.

Judging from reactions in the UK today, the enormity of last night’s events has only just begun to sink in. The BBC started the day with a headline that read: “EU-wide treaty change bid fails”. In the afternoon, it changed to “Eurozone deal reached without the UK”. Tonight, it’s “UK alone as EU agrees fiscal deal”.

Normally sensible commentators are seriously suggesting that Britain, already out, could now try to wield its veto power to prevent the other 26 forging ahead and making use of the EU Institutions in doing so. Prominent Liberal Democrats have spoken out in support of the deal. Which makes sense: Cameron couldn’t have exercised his veto without explicit authorisation from Nick Clegg.

But will the LibDems maintain their support for the British government position when it becomes clear that the UK is heading for the exit? And will the British population think again, now that an in/out choice has effectively been made for them by the coalition government, rather than in a referendum or at a General Election?

At the EU summit in Brussels yesterday Britain lived up to its century old stereotype of “perfidious albion”; which Wikipedia describes as “a pejorative phrase used within the context of international relations and diplomacy to refer to acts of duplicity, treachery and hence infidelity (with respect to promises made to or alliances formed with other nation states) by monarchs or governments of Britain (or England) in their pursuit of self-interest and the requirements of realpolitik”.

When the rest of Europe needed a deal to save the Euro, the European economy, and the global financial system, Britain whined about some petty domestic interests.  Remember, most of the financial regulations the rest of the EU are talking about were actually proposed by Britain to the G20 as a way of saving the global economy.  And also remember that Britain already has a “financial transactions tax” in that stamp duty is already paid on most financial transactions in the UK.  So, what exactly was Cameron trying to veto?  I just don’t get it, and nor does anyone outside a few crazed Europhobes on the extreme right of the British Conservative party.

So, the result is beautiful isolation, as 23 EU states set up a fiscal union.  This is inevitably a slippery slope to Britain’s exit from the EU and the single market: a major I victory for Merkel and Sarkozy, who called Cameron’s bluff.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Sweden will in all likelihood join the other 23 states.  After all, Denmark – the only other state with an opt-out from the Euro – has already agreed.  This is likely to lead within a year or two to a new treaty to replace the EU, amongst 27 states in Europe (the other 26 in the current EU plus Croatia).  Forget the European Union, the new European agreement will be a “European Fiscal and Political Union” with only the UK, Switzerland, Iceland and Norway on the periphery – rather like Puerto Rico in relation to the United States.

If this happens – which in effect is Britain being kicked out of the EU and the single market – the consequences will not only be huge for the British economy (since over 50% of our trade is with the rest of the EU), there will be knock-on effects on British public finances, as markets turn their focus away from a more stable Eurozone to UK government debt (which is already worse than Greece), and even an effect on the sustainability of United Kingdom.  Britain’s exit from Europe would be a huge boost for the campaign for Scottish independence.  A majority in Scotland may well decide that it would prefer to be one state in a European federal union than be tied to a moribund and bankrupt administration in Westminster and Whitehall.

So, how stupid will Tory Eurosceptics look in 5 or 10 years time, with “Little England” outside Europe, a collapse in British exports (as a result of exclusion from the European continental market), a gradual shift in Europe’s major financial centre from London to Frankfurt, skyrocketing government debt as markets demand 5% interest on British government bonds, and an independent Scotland?

Simon Hix is Professor of European and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Fellow of the British Academy.

In an op-ed published recently in the Financial Times, Jean-Claude Piris, who is the former chief lawyer for the EU Council of Ministers, warned that the present institutional set-up of the EU is “no longer tenable” and called for a two-speed Europe. Coming as it did from a former top-ranking EU official, from one of its founding member states (France), who was also one of the architects of the Lisbon Treaty, this was powerful stuff.

Piris is right. The European Union is in urgent need of repair. Its structures are incapable of dealing with the huge political and economic issues we are facing today. It lacks the legitimacy it needs to operate efficiently and effectively. His proposal to create an avant-garde group of 17 member states would allow the eurozone countries to forge ahead and should therefore be welcomed. But it doesn’t address the wider issues of crumbling legitimacy on the one hand, and the need to reinforce the stability and security of the European continent on the other.

There are two major fault lines which divide the current EU. The first is the euro. As most people now realise, the euro cannot function properly without a much greater degree of political and economic union. But such a level of integration cannot be achieved within the existing EU, given the strong anti-European sentiment in several member states, especially the UK. Europe cannot wait for a national consensus on EU membership to develop in the UK and other euro-reluctant countries before it puts its house in order.

The second fault line is identity. As the Brussels-based journalist, academic and producer Gareth Harding argued recently in a powerful speech at the University of Missouri, most European citizens (who don’t even see themselves as such) no longer have faith in the EU project. They believe the euro and enlargement were costly mistakes. They consider Turkish membership of the EU as a threat to our way of life. To win back their support, and to get Europe back on track, we need a new approach and a new architecture.

We have to accept the reality that some countries are ready and willing to be part of a single currency and all that entails, while others are not yet and may never be; we also have to recognise that some countries are ready, willing  and even eager to subsume some of their national and cultural identity into a European political union and others are not yet and may never be. All deserve a place at the European table. The answer is to replace the existing EU with a new two-layered structure.

The outer layer would be an overarching, less intrusive and more inclusive framework for European cooperation: a European Area of Freedom, Security and Prosperity (EFSP). This would comprise all EU and EFTA member states, as well as all existing EU candidate countries including Turkey. It could be expanded Eastward to all European countries, one day even up to and including Russia, if and when the Copenhagen accession criteria (or similar) are met.

EFSP would be a free trade area with a common foreign and security policy. It would operate on the basis of the existing internal market rules, although the creation of EFSP would be used as an opportunity to review and if necessary amend existing rules. It would co-operate on physical cross-border issues such as transport and the environment, but it would have no role in policy areas where public resistance to EU co-operation and fear of further enlargement is greatest, such as education, social and taxation policy and justice and home affairs.

All decisions in this area would be taken by unanimity, under the control of national parliaments, in recognition of the fact that many European countries aren’t ready to give up their veto or their policy-making powers in areas perceived to be of vital national or political importance. This will reduce the area’s firepower but enhance its legitimacy. EFSP would eventually be merged with the Council of Europe  and would take over the role of the OSCE. The European Court of Human Rights would be modernised to increase its legitimacy.

The inner core would be a European Political and Economic Union (EPEU), comprising a smaller group of member states without internal borders, all members of EFSP, a single market with a single currency and an integrated system of economic governance, with full political and fiscal union and democratic accountability at the EPEU level for decisions taken at that level. Schengen would be subsumed into this inner core.

Legislation governing the internal market would apply in this area over and above the free trade rules agreed within EFSP. To avoid gridlock and to ensure progress in making the necessary political and economic reforms, all decisions within EPEU would be taken by qualified majority. Membership of EPEU would be open to all members of EFSP, but the accession of new member states would be subject, as now, to the unanimous agreement of existing member states.

Such a new architecture would be inclusive, accommodating the increasing eurosceptic sentiment in several member states while at the same time bringing more countries into the European fold. But it would also allow countries that wish to do so to push ahead farther and faster with the integration of their political and economic systems. To get there we need to say goodbye to the EU as we know it. To build the Europe of the future we need to start from scratch.

We, concerned Europeans, call upon the governments of the Eurozone to agree in principle on the need for a legally binding agreement that would: 1) establish a common treasury that can raise funds for the Eurozone as a whole and ensure that member-states adhere to fiscal discipline; 2) reinforce common supervision, regulation and deposit insurance within the Eurozone; and 3) develop a strategy that will produce both economic convergence and growth because the debt problem cannot be solved without growth.

While a legally binding agreement is being negotiated and ratified, the governments of the Eurozone must in the interim empower the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) to cooperate in bringing the crisis under control. These institutions could then guarantee and eventually recapitalize the banking system and enable countries in need to refinance their debt, within agreed limits, at practically no cost by issuing treasury bills that can be rediscounted at the ECB.

We call upon the legislatures of the Eurozone countries to recognize that the euro needs a European solution. The pursuit of national solutions can only lead to dissolution.

Signatories:

Asger Aamund (Denmark)
President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)
Former President

Anders Aslund (Sweden)
Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Gordon Bajnai (Hungary)
Former Prime Minister of Hungary

Mario Baldassarri (Italy)
Member of the Italian Senate

Ulrich Beck (Germany)
Professor of Sociology, University of Munich

Peter Bofinger (Germany)
Economist; Member of the German Council of Economic Experts

Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria)
Founder, Communitas Foundation and President, Venture Equity Bulgaria Ltd

Emma Bonino (Italy)
Vice President of the Senate; former EU Commissioner

Elmar Brok (Germany)
Foreign policy spokesman for the EPP Group in the European Parliament

Erhard Busek (Austria)
Chairman of the Institute for the Danube and Central Europe; former Vice-Chancellor of Austria.

Maria Cattaui (Greece/Switzerland)
Former Secretary of International Chamber of Commerce

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany)
Member of the European Parliament

Bertrand Collomb (France)
Membre de l’Institut de France, Honorary Chairman of Lafarge

Massimo D’Alema (Italy)
President, Italianieuropei Foundation; President, Foundation for European Progressive Studies; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Daniel Daianu (Romania)
Former Finance Minister

George David (Cyprus/Greece)
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company.

Howard Davies (United Kingdom)
Economist

Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium)
Former Prime Minister; Member of the European Parliament

Ales Debeljak (Slovenia)
Professor, University of Ljubljana

Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy)
Director, Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria) – Brussels office

Pavol Demes (Slovakia)
Former Foreign Minister; Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States (Bratislava)

Kemal Dervis (Turkey)
Former Minister of State for Economic Affairs; Vice-President and Director of Global Economy and Development, Brookings.

Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary)
President, DEMOS Hungary

Andrew Duff (UK)
President of the Union of European Federalists

Sebastian Dullien (Germany)
Professor for International Economics, HTW Berlin – University of Applied Sciences

Hans Eichel (Germany)
Former Finance Minister

Joschka Fischer (Germany)
Former Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor

Timothy Garton Ash (UK)
Professor of European Studies, Oxford University

Anthony Giddens (UK)
Emeritus Professor, London School of Economics

Charles Goodhart (United Kingdom)
Economist; former member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee

Heather Grabbe (UK)
Executive Director, Open Society Institute – Brussels

Charles Grant (UK)
Director, Centre for European Reform

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Director of the Centre on International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University (New York); Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Operations at the UN

Alfred Gusenbauer (Austria)
Former Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria

Hans Hækkerup (Denmark)
Chairman, Defence Commission; former Defence Minister

David Hannay (United Kingdom)
Member of the House of Lords;

Chris Haskins (UK/Ireland)
Member of the House of Lords; Chair of the European Movement

Pierre Hassner (France)
Emeritus Research Director at Sciences-Po (CERI)

Steven Heinz (Austria)
Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Lansdowne Partners Ltd

Francois Heisbourg (France)
Chair of the IISS and Geneva Centre for Security Studies

Diego Hidalgo (Spain)
Co-founder of Spanish newspaper El País; President, FRIDE

Michiel van Hulten (The Netherlands)
Course leader of the FutureLab Europe programme, European Policy Centre, Brussels; former Member of the European Parliament

Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland)
Former Executive Director, Crisis Management Initiative; former Ambassador

Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)
Chairman, Munich Security Conference; Global Head of Government Affairs Allianz SE

Minna Jarvenpaa (Finland/US)
International Advocacy Director, Open Society Foundation

Mary Kaldor (UK)
Professor, London School of Economics

Glenys Kinnock (UK)
Shadow House of Lords spokesperson on international development

Gerald Knaus (Austria)
Chairman of the European Stability Initiative and Carr Center Fellow

Rem Koolhaas (The Netherlands)
Architect and urbanist and Professor at the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University

Fiorella Kostoris (Italian)
Economist

Bernard Kouchner (France)
Former Foreign Minister

Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria)
Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies

Armin Laschet (Germany)
Former Minister for Integration

Mark Leonard (UK)
Director, European Council on Foreign Relations

Gerard Lyons (UK)
Chief Economist and Head of Global Research at Standard Chartered

George Magnus (UK)
Senior Economic Adviser, UBS Investment Bank

Emma Marcegaglia (Italy)
President, Confindustria

Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Poland)
Former Polish Prime Minister

Dominique Moisi (France)
Senior Adviser, IFRI

Hildegard Müller (Germany)
Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft

Kalypso Nicolaidis (Greece/France)
Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

Christine Ockrent (Belgium)
CEO, Audiovisuel Extérieur de la France

Dick Oosting (The Netherlands)
CEO, European Council on Foreign Relations

Mabel van Oranje (The Netherlands)
CEO, The Elders

Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain)
Former EU Commissioner

Cem Ozdemir (Germany)
Co-Leader, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

Ana Palacio (Spain)
Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group

Jose Pérez Fernandes (Spain)
Chairman, Banco de Madrid

Julian Priestley (UK)
Former Secretary General of the European Parliament

Andrew Puddephatt (UK)
Director, Global Partners & Associated Ltd

Hélène Rey (France)
Professor of Economics, London Business School

George Robertson (UK)
Former Secretary General of NATO

Albert Rohan (Austria)
Former Secretary General for Foreign Affairs

Dariusz Rosati (Poland)
Former Foreign Minister

Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland)
Former Foreign Minister

Olivier Roy (France)
Professor, European University Institute (Florence)

Daniel Sachs (Sweden)
CEO, Proventus

Marietje Schaake (The Netherlands)
Member of the European Parliament

Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy)
Head of Public Affairs – Executive Vice President, Unicredit SpA

Narcís Serra (Spain)
Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice President of the Spanish Government

David Simon (UK)
Member of the House of Lords; Former Chairman of BP

Aleksander Smolar (Poland)
Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Foundation

Javier Solana (Spain)
Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy & Secretary-General of the Council of the EU; former Secretary General of NATO

Pedro Solbes (Spain)
Former EU Commissioner and former Minister of Finance

Carlos Solchago (Spain)
Former Minister of Economy and Finance from 1985 to 1993; former Chair of the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund 1991-1993; Director-Partner of Solchaga Recio & asociados.

George Soros (Hungary/US)
Founder and Chairman, Open Society Foundations

Pär Stenbäck (Finland)
Former Foreign Minister

Ion Sturza (Romania)
President, GreenLight Invest.; former Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova

Paweł Swieboda (Poland)
President, Demos-EUROPA, Centre for European Strategy

Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece)
Professor, University of Athens and President, ELIAMEP

George Vassiliou (Cyprus)
Former President

Guy Verhofstadt (Belgium)
Member of the European Parliament; leader of the ALDE Group; former Prime Minister

Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia)
Former President

David Vines (UK)
Professor of Economics, Oxford University

Antonio Vitorino (Portugal)
Lawyer; former European Commissioner

Norbert Walter (Germany)
Former Chief Economist, Deutsche Bank

Stephen Wall (UK)
Former British Permanent Representative to the European Union

Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain)
Ambassador of Spain to Brazil

Stelios Zavvos (Greece)
CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd

Last month, France launched legal proceedings against the Parliament’s decision, on 9 March, to rationalise its calendar of meetings for 2012 and 2013 by holding two Strasbourg plenary sessions during the same week.

The letter to the French minister was sent on Bastille Day, 14 July, and is an initiative of the Brussels-Strasbourg Seat Study Group (disclaimer: I work for two of its members!)

Today, Martin Schulz forgot to vote. He voted on roll call vote nr. 30, and he voted on roll call vote nr. 32. But on vote nr. 31, sandwiched between the other two, his normally steady hand missed the electronic voting button.

At stake was paragraph 127 in the report by Mr. Garriga Polledo (EPP) on a new Multiannual Financial Framework, which reads as follows: “Points to the significant savings that could be made if the European Parliament were to have a single seat”.

In other words, the vote on paragraph 127 was a vote on whether MEPs should continue to meet in Strasbourg, as required by the EU Treaty, or whether the Parliament should have a single base in Brussels, saving hundreds of millions of euros as well as lots of time and misery.

The last important vote on this issue was in March this year, when MEPs voted to reduce from 12 to 11 the number of times they have to travel to the Alsatian capital every year. That vote, won by a big margin, was held by secret ballot – meaning that no-one could see how MEPs had voted. Closet Brussels-supporters among the official pro-Strasbourg camp were therefore free to follow their instincts.

This time, the vote was by roll call – meaning everyone would know how everyone else had voted. Despite this, and to general surprise, MEPs overwhelmingly backed a single seat, defeating an amendment to delete the relevant paragraph by 353 votes to 282, with 38 abstentions.

Take that, Paris! But even more interesting is what the detailed roll call results show:

• Of all the Parliament’s political group leaders, only Joseph Daul (EPP) voted against having a single seat.
• Several French MEPs voted to back a single seat, including Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Karima Delli, and Marie-Christine Vergiat.
• Pro-Strasbourg MEPs voted against having a single seat despite recent calls for a single seat (in Strasbourg!) by Strasbourg and the French Senate.
• Despite the wide margin of victory, several well-known EPP supporters of ‘Brussels’ still voted pro-Strasbourg. Because their group had failed to inform them of what was at stake?
• Over two-thirds of Martin Schulz’s S&D group backed a single seat.

But Martin Schulz himself did not vote. A long-time proponent of Strasbourg himself, has he perhaps concluded that with an important election looming, and the EP, including his own group, turning decisively against Strasbourg, it is wiser to keep a low profile? One can only wonder what Strasbourg-supporting Joseph Daul will make of it all.

(For a detailed breakdown of today’s vote, see VoteWatch.eu: http://votewatch.eu/cx_vote_details.php?id_act=1871&lang=en)

‘A post-crisis agenda for the centre-left: securing shared prosperity’, is the theme of this year’s conference. But it is not just the economic crisis that needs resolving. The centre-left itself is also in trouble. Twelve years after Clinton’s Third Way took the world by storm, social democrats are out of power in most European countries. In 1999 all but two EU governments were of the centre-left. Today only 5 out of 27 member states have a socialist or social-democratic Prime Minister. Of the handful of left-leaning  governments that remain, most are in serious electoral trouble.

Many believed the collapse of ‘casino capitalism’ would lead to an instant revival in social democratic fortunes. The opposite has happened. With a few notable exceptions, the left’s downward spiral has continued. There are three important reasons for this.

First, the centre-left has failed to keep up with the economic and social aspirations of its traditional supporters. When most social democratic parties were founded in the early 20th century, they represented a large working class in urgent need of emancipation. The interests of trade unions and social democratic parties largely coincided; in fact there was often little distinction between them.

Today, the majority of European workers consider themselves middle class and are wary of outside interference, whether by the state, trade unions or anyone else. They see traditional social democratic parties as an obstacle to fulfilling their ambitions rather than as a helping hand. They rebel against so-called progressive politicians who propagate statist, collectivist solutions for their electorate while sending their own children to the private school of their choice. They resent centre-left leaders who ignore emerging problems such as uncontrolled migration, violent crime in poor neighbourhoods and increased social and cultural segregation.

Instead of responding to these concerns and modernising its approach, the centre-left has chosen to limit itself to defending the remnants of an ageing welfare state. Social democratic parties have become technocratic, focus-group driven automatons more concerned with clinging to office than with winning the battle of ideas.

Second, in their eagerness to endorse capitalism, social democrats also embraced its failings. In the 1980s and early 1990s many voters questioned the centre-left’s commitment to the market economy. But instead of allying themselves with small and medium-sized enterprises and developing a convincing social market alternative to laissez-faire capitalism, the parties’ response was to adopt, uncritically, much of Thatcherite neo-liberal agenda and to develop close, even intimate relations with the corporate business elite, including the now much-maligned banking sector.

When the financial crisis erupted, social democratic leaders were too complicit in the market’s failings and too closely associated with its main protagonists (not least through party funding) to be able to offer a credible alternative. Last week for instance it emerged that the Flemish Socialist Party’s most outspoken critic of ‘fat cat’ bonuses had received just such a bonus himself, when still a banker. Not surprisingly the incident served to further undermine the party’s standing with its already dwindling band of supporters.

Third, social democrats lost touch by failing to modernise their parties and the political system as a whole. In the Netherlands the Labour Party is the only one of the big three traditional parties not to have introduced full one member, one vote at its party conferences. The British Labour Party still has a dominant trade union block vote, which turned out to be decisive in electing Ed over David Miliband as party leader last year. The German SPD doesn’t allow its individual members any direct say whatsoever at national level.

Social democrats everywhere have become major beneficiaries and staunch defenders of ‘jobs for the boys’ networks and appointments in both the public and private sectors. Even cautious constitutional and institutional reforms, such as the proposed introduction of the Alternative Vote in the UK, or the direct election of mayors in the Netherlands, are slapped down by party elites keen to protect their traditional fiefdoms and prerogatives. As a result, centre-left politics has become synonymous with preservation of the status quo – precisely the opposite of what it once set out to achieve.

Does this mean that centre-left politics is dead? Not at all. There will always be an electoral market for a progressive movement that addresses voters’ everyday concerns (a good job, reliable transport, safe streets, affordable health care, a decent education for their children) with common sense solutions which create opportunity but also ensure fairness. A five percent electoral swing is enough to bring progressive parties back into power. But getting there will require brave politicians prepared to lead from the front.

They will have to ditch the rigid ideological and organisational frameworks of the early 2Oth century in favour of pragmatic, results-oriented policies and new alliances, even mergers, between parties and movements of the centre-left. They must promote a new social and economic paradigm that values individual opportunity, choice and initiative above collective provision and consumption and declares war on costly and greedy monopolies and oligopolies (both public and private). And they need to show a renewed commitment, both at home and abroad, to the core values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which constitute the backbone of a civilised society.

A strong and effective European Union is essential in helping national governments achieve these objectives. But first the centre-left will have to re-engage with an increasingly eurosceptic public by improving the transparency of the decision-making process, tackling waste and inefficiency and giving voters more say over the political direction of the European project.

The victory of Barack Obama in the United States and other centre-left success stories in countries as diverse as Australia, Brazil, Chile and Norway show there is a future for progressive politics. Denmark’s Prime Minister-in-waiting Helle Thorning-Schmidt also exemplifies the type of modern social democratic leadership that is required. What it takes now for the centre-left is the courage of its convictions and a decisive break with the past. That’s what this week’s Oslo conference should be about.

In written answers to questions put to him by Han ten Broeke, Member of Parliament for Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s ruling Liberal VVD party, the minister also said the Dutch government would work with its EU partners to build support for a change to the Treaty to give the Parliament a single seat. He said that he is following with interest the work being done by the Brussels-Strasbourg Seat Study Group on finding alternatives for Strasbourg.

The minister says last week’s vote on the Parliament’s calendar of meetings for 2012 and 2013, when it decided to combine two monthly plenary sessions during a single week, is “a positive development”.

Below is my own and therefore unofficial translation of Mr. Ten Broeke’s questions and the Minister’s answers.

Answers by Mr. Knapen, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to questions from Member of Parliament Ten Broeke (VVD) about a study which shows that an annual saving of 180 million euros can be made in relation to the European Parliament budget

Question 1

Are you familiar with the results of the study ‘A tale of two cities’ that was published on 10 February by one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, Mr. McMillan-Scott?

Answer

Yes.

Question 2

Do you share the opinion of the British government that this represents “an enormous and unnecessary waste of money and resources”?

Answer

Yes.

Question 3

With reference to the statement by the European Commissioner for Budget, Lewandowski, that the European Institutions themselves cannot avoid making budget cuts in times of austerity, do you agree that having a single seat for the European Parliament could make a significant contribution to this goal, and are you prepared to raise this issue in the context of the revision of the Financial Perspectives?

Answer

Yes. Especially in times of austerity the two seats of the European Parliament and the cost this entails cannot be justified. I will therefore raise this issue in the context of the revision of the Financial Perspectives.

Question 4

Now that the study published by Mr. McMillan-Scott has shown that a large majority of MEPs (88%) favour of a single seat for the European Parliament, in Brussels, and that they are of the opinion that a suitable alternative must be found for Strasbourg, are you prepared to use this new information in bilateral contacts and in the European Council, in line with what was agreed in the coalition agreement, to argue for Brussels as the single seat for the European Parliament and to look for a suitable alternative for Strasbourg?

Answer

I am pleased with this study and consider it supports this government’s goal of a single seat for the European Parliament. As far as the percentage of 88% is concerned I would like to point out that this is the result of a survey of 417 participants, including 61 MEPs (out of the current 736) and 348 EP assistants. The government will certainly use the study to reinforce its case for a single seat in its contacts with EU partners. As you know changing the current practice requires an intergovernmental decision which all member states must ultimately agree to. Right now there is still insufficient support for this among member states. As you know France continues to insist on Strasbourg as the seat. It should be noted that on 10 March the European Parliament voted by a large majority to amend its calendar of meetings for 2012 and 2013, ensuring that two Strasbourg sessions will now be combined. This will result in a saving of one trip there and back during those years. That is a positive development.

Question 5

Do you agree that when looking for a credible solution to the ‘Strasbourg problem’, adequate attention should be paid to compensating France, which for its own reasons remains attached to the two-seat arrangement laid down in the Treaty?

Answer

France will not simply want to give up the Strasbourg seat. I’m aware of the fact that Mr. McMillan-Scott’s study group in the European Parliament is thinking about scenario’s which can serve as compensation for France. I am following this with interest.

Last week, the European Parliament voted to back just such a tax. A report by Greek Socialist Anni Podimata was adopted by a large majority that included most of the centre-right EPP and liberal ALDE groups. MEPs even voted by 361 to 298 for a centre-left amendment saying that in the absence of a global agreement, the EU should go ahead and introduce the tax anyway. French and German members of the EPP group and French and Italian members of the ALDE group handed the centre-left its victory. Interestingly, the two parties in the German coalition government did not vote the same way, with German FDP members voting against the tax.

How do we know all this? Because there’s a website, www.votewatch.eu, that keeps track of MEP voting behaviour and provides regular analyses to a Brussels audience. Today Votewatch.eu organised a debriefing on the FTT at the Centre for European Policy Studies, where it is based. The Socialist rapporteur was there, as was her EPP shadow, former Commissioner Danuta Hübner. The room was packed with staff of the EU Institutions, diplomats, representatives of the financial services industry and consultants.

Considering that the report adopted last week is not legally binding, it was quite a turnout. But legally binding it may as well have been. Following last year’s financial crisis, and armed with its new powers acquired under Lisbon, the Parliament now shows real muscle when it wants to. When the Parliament votes by a large majority to back a measure that until recently was considered just an odd leftwing hobby, the Commission and member states had better sit up and listen.

The Votewatch.eu presentation at today’s event, which was later circulated to all participants, can be found here.

In the statement France says that, following the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament has more powers than ever, and that holding two plenary sessions during the same week will undermine its ability to do its job effectively.

It’s touching of the French government to care about MEPs’ ability to cope with the additional stress caused by their new powers. Most MEPs of course would argue that it is the fact that they have to trek to Strasbourg once a month from their base in Brussels that makes it harder to do their work.